In re Samson Resources Corporation by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-4-2019 
In re Samson Resources Corporation 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"In re Samson Resources Corporation" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 1093. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/1093 
This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3438 
___________ 
 
In Re: SAMSON RESOURCES CORPORATION,  
Reorganized Debtor,  
 
Calvin D. Williams, 
Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-00084) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 12, 2019 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed October 4, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Calvin D. Williams appeals from the order of the District Court affirming an order 
of the Bankruptcy Court that disallowed his claim in this Chapter 11 bankruptcy  
proceeding.  We will affirm as well. 
I. 
 Samson Resources Corporation and certain of its affiliates (collectively, 
“Samson”) operate in the oil and gas industries.  Samson filed a Chapter 11 petition in 
2015, and the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Plan in 2017.  
 This appeal concerns Samson’s working interest in a mineral-rights lease executed 
in 1949 by appellant Williams’s great-grandfather, Will Seamster.  That lease granted to 
a predecessor-in-interest of Samson the rights to oil and gas from a tract of land in 
Louisiana that the parties refer to as the “Seamster Tract.”  Seamster retained a royalty 
interest in oil and gas produced from the Seamster Tract.  Over the years, that royalty 
interest has passed to and been divided among Seamster’s many heirs, including 
Williams.  Samson acquired its working interest in the lease in 2003 and, since then, it 
has produced mostly gas from the Seamster Tract and has paid royalties to Williams and 
the other inheritors of Seamster’s royalty interest. 
  As part of its bankruptcy, Samson sought to sell its working interest in the 
Seamster Tract lease to a third-party.  Williams objected to the sale and claimed, inter 
alia, that the 1949 lease was fraudulent and invalid from the outset or had terminated by 
non-production by 1959.  The Bankruptcy Court held a full evidentiary hearing on his 
objection and overruled it after concluding that the 1949 lease was valid as a factual 
matter.  The Bankruptcy Court also concluded in the alternative that applicable Louisiana 
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law barred Williams from challenging the lease both because Williams had accepted 
benefits thereunder (i.e., his royalty payments) and because the prescriptive period for 
challenging the lease had long expired.  Williams appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling 
to the District Court, but his appeal was untimely and the District Court dismissed it on 
that basis.  We affirmed that dismissal.  See In re Samson Res. Corps., 726 F. App’x 162, 
165 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 340 (2018). 
 Williams also filed a proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court claiming that Samson 
owed him an unspecified amount for fraud and misappropriation of funds.  Williams once 
again argued that the 1949 lease was invalid (which he presumably believed would have 
entitled him to more money).  He also argued that Samson had otherwise miscalculated 
his royalties.  After Samson objected to Williams’s claim, the Bankruptcy Court once 
again held a full evidentiary hearing, sustained the objection, and disallowed the claim.   
Williams appealed that ruling to the District court as well, and the District Court 
affirmed.  The District Court concluded (as had the Bankruptcy Court) that Williams was 
collaterally estopped from contesting the validity of the 1949 lease again.  The District 
Court also concluded that his challenges to that lease were precluded by and lacked merit 
under applicable Louisiana law.  Finally, the District Court concluded that Williams had 
not challenged Samson’s calculation of his royalties, had not presented any evidence on 
that issue, and thus had provided “no evidentiary basis to rule in his favor.”  (ECF No. 28 
at 13.)  Williams now appeals to us.1 
                                              
1 In his pro se notice of appeal, Williams purports to represent the interests of 10 other 
holders of royalty interests in the Seamster Tract who also filed unsuccessful claims in 
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II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s order under  
28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have jurisdiction to review it under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) 
and 1291.  Like the District Court, we review the Bankruptcy Court’s legal conclusions 
de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its exercise of discretion for abuse 
thereof.  See In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 251 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013).   
 Having carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs, we will affirm 
substantially for the reasons explained by the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court.  
The Bankruptcy Court held a full hearing on Williams’s claim, and both that court and 
the District Court thoroughly explained why it lacks merit.  Williams argues on appeal 
that “this case is not about” any of the issues on which the District Court ruled and is 
instead about the underlying validity of the 1949 lease.  As the District Court explained, 
however, Williams is collaterally estopped from relitigating the validity of the lease in 
this proceeding. 
 Williams challenges that ruling for the first time in his reply brief.  Williams 
forfeited that challenge by failing to raise it in his opening brief, see Garza v. Citigroup 
Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 284-85 (3d Cir. 2018), and it also lacks merit.  As the District Court 
explained, all of the requirements of collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, are 
satisfied here—Williams previously litigated the validity of the lease, the Bankruptcy 
                                              
the Bankruptcy Court (but who do not appear to have appealed to the District Court).  
Williams may not do so pro se.  See Murray ex rel. Purnell v. City of Phila., 901 F.3d 
169, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2018).  Thus, we address only Williams’s own claim.  
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Court adjudicated that issue, and its adjudication was necessary to its decision.  See 
United States v. 5 Unlabeled Boxes, 572 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009).2  
Williams argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because he previously 
challenged the validity of the lease in the context of his objection to Samson’s sale of its 
working interest, not his proof of claim.  That distinction does not matter for purposes of 
collateral estoppel, which (unlike res judicata in the sense of claim preclusion) focuses on 
issues rather than claims.  See id. at 173-74.  Thus, we agree with the courts below that 
Williams was collaterally estopped from contesting the validity of the 1949 lease again.  
Williams has not otherwise raised any meaningful challenge to the lower courts’ rulings 
and, in light of his pro se status, we note that we perceive no basis for one. 
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Williams’s request 
 
in his opening brief for appointment of counsel is denied. 
                                              
2 The Bankruptcy Court adjudicated the validity of the lease in approving the sale of 
Samson’s working interest.  Williams’s appellate challenges to that ruling were still 
ongoing when the Bankruptcy Court and District Court applied collateral estoppel in this 
case (Williams’s appeal was still pending in this Court when the Bankruptcy Court ruled, 
and his petition for certiorari was still pending in the United States Supreme Court when 
the District Court ruled).  As the District Court recognized, these circumstances did not 
prevent application of collateral estoppel.  See 5 Unlabeled Boxes, 572 F.3d at 175.  The 
Bankruptcy Court and the District Court could have waited to apply collateral estoppel 
until Williams’s appeals were resolved, but they were not required to do so.  See id.  In 
any event, any concerns in that regard “have now been allayed” because the Supreme 
Court has since denied Williams’s petition for certiorari.  Id. 
